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I. WHAT IS A SECURITY?
Recent Supreme Court decisions limiting access to the courts under the
federal securities laws' manifest a restrictive approach in discerning what
is a security.2 Essentially, the issue in cases defining a "security" is
whether the securities laws3 regulate a particular activity. The activity to
' See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 463 (1977);Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Pendulum Swings].
2 One of the most controversial areas of the securities field involves the definition of what
transactions are covered by such laws. The courts have found the securities laws applicable
to numerous transactions bearing little resemblance to traditionally recognized securities. For
example, a security existed where chinchillas were sold by a promoter who falsely promised
purchasers that the animals were easy to raise and resalable to the promoter at a profit. Miller
v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974). A security also was found to
exist where scotch whiskey receipts were sold by a promoter guaranteeing that the receipts
would double in value within four years and that he would manage the goods during that
period. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974); see
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (savings and loan withdrawable certificates are
securities); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sale
of rare coin portfolios to general public are securities).
Generally, "security" refers to a "written obligation, evidence or document of ownership
or creditorship giving the holder the right to demand and receive property not in his posses-
sion, such as issued to investors to finance a business enterprise." 1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1071 (1977). For an overview of the types of securities, see Bloomenthal, The Many Faces
of a Security (Pts. 1-2), 22 PRAc. LAW. 43 (Jan. 1976), 29 (March 1976).
3 There are two major securities acts. The first is the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1976). The '33 Act requires a company which issues a security to be sold in
interstate or foreign commerce to disclose all information important to a reasonable investor.
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). Public
disclosure is accomplished by requiring the issuing company to file a registration statement
open to public inspection with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 5 of
the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). The statement must contain a description of the regis-
trant's properties and business, information about management, a description of the offered
security and its relationship to the registrant's other capital securities, and financial state-
ments certified by independent public accountants. See 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECUrriTES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 1.02[3] (rev. perm. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
BLOOMENTHAL]. Furthermore, disclosure is accomplished by requiring the issuer to provide
each purchaser with a prospectus containing the information in the registration statement
and to notify each purchaser of any material changes in such information prior to the sale.
Section 5(b)(2) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976); see SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1098 (2d Cir. 1972).
The second major law is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). The
'34 Act extends the disclosure provisions of the '33 Act by requiring corporations listed on
the national stock exchanges and those corporations with assets over one million dollars and
a class of equity securities held by five hundred or more shareholders to register with the SEC.
Section 12(g)(1) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976).
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be regulated usually involves a purchaser4 alleging that a promoter' dis-
seminated misleading facts8 in connection with a particular scheme.7 Al-
though the courts generally focus on the circumstances surrounding the
scheme,8 the statutes list only certain types of documents as securities.9
Accordingly, the generalized definitions given in section 2(1)10 of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and section 3(a)(10)" of the Securities
' The term "purchase" encompasses a wide variety of activities. Although generally
"purchase" involves an investor providing funds in return for some evidence of ownership in
an enterprise, it can also include less obvious actions. Thus one may be a purchaser of a
security when supplying funds to be invested in the sole discretion of a fund manager, SEC
v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), or by being a member of a
union who through collective bargaining receives an employer funded pension plan. Daniels
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
1232 (1978).
1 The term "promoter" includes those parties who directly or indirectly take the initia-
tive in organizing a profit making activity. See Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888
(10th Cir. 1939); 17 C.F.R. 230.405(g) (1977).
' Both Acts contain antifraud provisions providing civil and criminal penalties against
issuing companies, company officials and individuals who disseminate false or misleading
statements in connection with the retail purchase or sale of securities. See § § 11, 12, & 17(a)
of the '3$ Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77g(a) (1976); §§ 10(b) & 15(c)(1) of the '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(c)(1) (1976); Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). Furthermore, a private implied right of action for fraud has been
found under a number of sections of the Acts. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Share Corp.,
311 U.S. 282 (1940) (§ 12 of '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1) (1976)); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969) (§ 10b of '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)) Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 342 F.2d
596 (7th Cir. 1965) rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1967) (§ 17(a) of '33 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g(a) (1976); Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 762 (1937)
(§ 11 of '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976)).
"Scheme" denotes the process by which the promoter obtains his working capital. See,
e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1948).
See, e.g., United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
See notes 10-11 infra.
10 Section 2(1) of the '33 Act defines a security as follows:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as'a 'security,' or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt of, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
Section 3(a) of the '33 Act exempts from certain provisions of that Act several classes of
securities including:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current
transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is
likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976).
" Section 3(a)(10) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), defines a security in
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Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) supply little guidance to the courts." Fur-
thermore, the legislative history fails to help delineate the limits of the
Acts. 3 Therefore in discerning the scope of the legislation, the lower courts
rely primarily on Supreme Court decisions concerning the definition of
"security" and those opinions indicating the Courts receptiveness to ex-
pansion of coverage under the Acts.
Recent interpretations of what constitutes a "security" emphasize the
analysis adopted in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,14 one of the few Supreme
Court cases on this issue."5 Under this decision, a scheme is considered a
security when it "involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."'" Traditionally,
courts have relied on this functional test 7 when determining whether a
security exists." Howey itself involved the issue of whether the offering of
substantially the same manner as the '33 Act, see note 10 supra, but omits the term "evidence
of indebtedness," excludes short term paper from the definition, omits the "current transac-
tions" language, and makes minor changes in the classifications of oil and gas interests as
securities.
12 See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
1" See Definition of a "Security," 1976-1977 Securities Law Development, 34 WASH. &
LEE L. Rnv. 863, 864 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Definition of a "Security'.
" 328 U.S. 293 (1948). Howey involved an investment contract; however, the definition
espoused in this case arguably could be adopted as the generic definition of a security under
the securities laws. Newton, What Is a Security?: A Critical Analysis, 48 Mis. L.J. 167, 176
n.21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Newton]. For an in depth discussion supporting emphasis
on Howey in determining the existence of a security, see Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship
Between an Issuer and the Securities, 27 U. MINN. L. Rnv. 395 (1973).
,1 The Supreme Court cases defining a security are SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); and United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
" 328 U.S. at 301.
'7 Both courts and commentators generally divide the Howey test into three or four
component parts: (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with profits (4)
to come solely from the efforts of others. See, e.g., Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., .497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974); Newton, supra note 14, at 174; Definition of a "Security": Survey of 1974 Securities
Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 721 (1975) [hereinafter cites as '74 "Security'].
Failure to satisfy one of these elements requires a finding that the contract is not a security
within the meaning of the securities laws. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.,
460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (19th Cir. 1972) (no security where "solely from efforts of others" compo-
nent not met). But see Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 926-27 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(security existed even though "solely from efforts of other" test not satisfied).
" See, e.g., United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976);
SEC v. Haffenden-Rimar Int'l, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); Los Angeles Trust Deed
& Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
For a discussion of the application of Howey to less traditional security schemes, see Com-
ment, What is a Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, and Franchise Agreements, 22 U. KA.
L. Rxv. 55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Franchise Agreements].
1978]
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plots of a citrus grove development constituted an investment contract
when sold in conjunction with a contract for cultivating, marketing and
remitting of net proceeds from fruit sales.'" The Court found the core of
the scheme to be no more than a contribution of money by the purchaser
in return for a share of the profits generated by the promoter."0 The Court
held that this scheme, involving the sale of real estate, was a traditional
"investment contract."2' Since real estate transactions are beyond tradi-
tional security concepts, 2 the decision signified a flexible approach to de-
fining a security. Underlying this approach was a desire to fulfill the statu-
tory purpose of full and fair disclosure in connection with schemes where
one seeks to use the "money of others on the promise of profit.
22
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Howey in Tcherepnin v. Knight.'4 The
Tcherepnin opinion underscores the Howey rationale that the term
"security" should be construed broadly to effectuate the remedial purposes
underlying the securities laws." The case involved withdrawable capital
shares" which the Seventh Circuit had found not covered by the Acts
because the instruments were facially distinguishable from traditional se-
curities. 2 The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, reasoned
that because of the congressional policy of preventing fraud in investment
areas, the investment character of the shares dictated that the sharehold-
ers be entitled to the protection afforded by the securities laws. Thus even
though emphasis on elements stressed by the Seventh Circuit could have
allowed a contrary result, the Supreme Court expanded the Acts' coverage
" 328 U.S. at 297.
2 Id. The Court emphasized that realistically the individual purchaser would be unable
to develop his lot due to lack of experience, lack of equipment, and economies of scale. Id.
" Id. at 299.
21 See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, at § 2.14.
11 Id. The securities laws were a response to a congressional finding that over half of the
securities issued in the decade following World War I proved to be worthless. See
BLOOMENrrHAL, supra note 3, at § 2.01[1]. A congressional report stated that "[t]he flotation
of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made possible because of the complete
abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in securities of those standards of fair,
honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of investment in any
enterprise." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73 Cong., 1st Sess. (1934), quoted in BLOOMENrrHAL, supra note
3, at § 201[1] (1933). The disclosure requirements of the Acts were designed to correct this
situation in two ways. First, fraudulent schemes would be hampered and deterred merely by
the requirement that details be revealed. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act
of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173 (1933). Second, the availability of all relevant financial informa-
tion on a security would allow investment services and expert investors to appraise more
accurately the worth of a security and thereby establish a reasonable price. Id.
24 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
" Id. at 336.
" Withdrawable capital shares are basically savings accounts with dividends being de-
termined by the profit of the investing institution. Id.
- 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967). In finding the shares distinguishable from traditional
securities, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that there were no limits on the number of shares
issued, the shares were nonnegotiable and there were no rights in the holders to inspect
corporate books. Id. at 376.
389 U.S. at 345-46.
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by use of the Howey test."9
Supreme Court decisions since Tcherepnin, however, indicate a policy
of limiting the coverage of the securities laws.3" During this period, a more
restrictive view of the Acts has prevailed in each major securities deci-
sion.3' These decisions show a tendency to curb the power of the Securities
Exchange Commission" and to encourage plaintiffs to concentrate upon
state remedies.? One of these recent decisions, United Housing Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Forman,u involved the definition of a security. Forman con-
cerned certain "stocks" the ownership of which allowed the purchaser to
lease apartments in a state subsidized, non-profit housing cooperative.
3
1
The major issue of the case was whether the Howey "expectation of profit"
criterion was satisfied.? Reading Howey broadly, the Second Circuit found
" See generally Comment, 34 Mo. L. REv. 260 (1969).
" See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 326 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S.
232 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); The Pendulum Swings, supra
note 1, at 919. The lack of legislative history behind the definitional sections of the Acts is
critical in distinguishing cases defining a security from recent Supreme Court cases limiting
plaintiff's rights under the Acts. For example, in a recent case refusing to allow a cause of
action to nonpurchasing offerors of stock, the Supreme Court was able to rely on legislative
history indicating that Congress had rejected an amendment to the '34 Act which would have
extended protection to certain nonpurchasers. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. at 732. Legislative history also was emphasizd in a case involving a short term
purchase-sale sequence which allegedly violated § 16(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1976). In finding for the defendant, the Court relied primarily on an exemption in early drafts
of § 16(b) which by implication could be incorporated into the final version. See Foremost-
McKennon, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976). Since the legislative history of
the definitional sections of the Acts is limited, the lower courts attempting to limit the
application of the Acts lack a rationale central to some of the recent cases. But see United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (coverage of Acts limited without
reference to legislative history).
31 See note 30 supra; The Pendulum Swings, supra note 1, at 921.
32 See, e.g., TCS Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (weakens SEC
staff's position when negotiating for additional disclosure in registration statements); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (may require SEC to proie scienter when seeking
injunctions); Rondeau v. Mosiness Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (undercuts SEC position
that traditional prerequisites for injunctive relief need not be shown by SEC); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limits SEC's standing to those factual
situations that fit within narrow purchaser-seller requirements).
3 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (encourages use of common
law fraud actions); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (federal remedies
limited to less imaginative forms than available in state courts); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 81975) (denial of standing in federal court will require
nonpurchaser-seller plaintiffs to rely on state remedy).
3, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
Id. at 842.
31 Id. at 854-60. A second issue in Forman was whether the securities laws applied solely
because the promoter had used the term "stock" in describing the scheme. Generally the
1978]
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an expectation of profit based on future rental reductions of nominal
amounts, available tax deductions and savings from renting state subsi-
dized apartments. 7 Consistent with its recent policy, the Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's decision and refused to extend the securities
laws to cover areas possessing such a limited profit motive."
Although the Supreme Court's rationale in Forman is reasonable, the
courts deemphasize the terminology associated with a particular scheme and focus on
whether the investor's risk is of the nature typically associated with traditional securities. See
generally Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 HASTINos L.J. 219 (1974). This focus is usually denoted the "economic
reality" of a scheme. Id. at at 220. In determining whether a security is involved in a particu-
lar scheme, analysis of the type, character and allocation of risk is more important than the
terminology involved. Id. at 241. Thus in Forman, the Supreme Court rejected the Second
Circuit's reasoning that the use of the word "stock," a term listed in the Act's definition of a
"security," was enough to allow coverage, 421 U.S. at 851.
The recent case of SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,072 (9th Cir. 1977), illustrates the emphasis on "economic reality"
in determining whether a scheme involves traditional security risk. At issue in this case was
whether a naked double commodity option was an "investment contract." Futures contracts,
agreements obligating the investor to purchase various commodities not yet produced, and
future options, agreements by which the purchaser buys the right to sell or purchase a future
contract at some later date, underlie such schemes. Id. at 91,825. The profitability of such
agreements depend on what the market believes will be the ultimate value of the produce
involved and this in turn will be based on expectations as to certain agricultural conditions.
Id. at 91,825-26, quoting Jones & Cook, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 457, 460 (1975). Since the profitability of both the futures
contract and the futures option do not depend on entreprenurial activity neither are consid-
ered securities. SEC v. Commodity Option Int'l, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,072, at 91,827; see, e.g., Sinva v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (futures contract not a security but only
obligation to buy produce at later date).
When dealing with naked double options of the type involved in Commodity Options,
as distinguished from typical futures options, the futures characteristics are a mere facade.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,072, at 91,828. The dealers in such
options do not maintain adequate inventories of the underlying futures contracts and there
is generally no intent that the actual commodities represented by the futures will be traded.
See Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract as a Security, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv.
211, 213 (1973). The investor actually does not acquire an interest in an underlying futures
contract or an option, but rather obtains a share of the profits of the promoting corporation.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,072, at 91,828. The investor's
money is pooled with that of other investors to be reinvested at the discretion of the promot-
ers. Thus the investor's risk is not based on the market conditions pertaining to a certain
commodity; but rather is based on the expertise of the promoter in speculating in the com-
modity market. Id. This risk is essentially the same as the risk associated with traditional
securities and therefore the economic reality of the scheme illustrates that it should be
covered by the securities laws. See SEC v. American Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361,
1366-67 (10th Cir. 1976). Accordingly, the Commodity Options court found that a naked
double commodity option was a security. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,072, at 91,828; cf. Melton v. Unterreiner, 436 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (a
scheme denoted a "trust" was found to be more like traditional securities than traditional
trusts not covered by the Acts).
11 See Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom,
United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
421 U.S. at 855-56.
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essential point is that the Second Circuit's position was not totally unrea-
sonable. In fact, the court of appeals' result appears consistent with the
broad protective policy underlying the Tcherepnin decision. The Forman
opinion thus indicates that the Court is now less willing to expand the
Howey test so as to achieve the remedial purposes emphasized in Howey
and Tcherepnin.11 This limitation is not absolute, however, as the Forman
opinion reaffirmed both Howey and Tcherepnin1' Therefore, the rule that
arguably results from Forman is that the Howey test generally should be
read strictly so as to effectuate the Supreme Court's policy of limiting the
scope of the Acts; but in situations in which the need for disclosure under
the Acts is acute, a broad reading of the Howey standard may be adopted.4
The tension between the Forman presumption against expanding the
scope of the Acts and the Howey-Techerepnin emphasis on fostering the
broad congressional purposes underlying the legislation is illustrated by
the differing analysis in two recent cases, Daniel v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters4 and Robinson v. United Mine Workers,4 both involv-
ing employee retirement benefit plans. The Daniel decision stressed the
remedial nature of the Acts. Daniel involved a noncontributory," compul-
sory"' pension plan sponsored by the plaintiff's union. The plan called for
twenty years of service before a member would be eligible for benefits. The
union denied the plaintiff benefits claiming that the service requirement
had not been met since he had not worked twenty continuous years be-
cause of an involuntary, two month layoff.4 6 The plaintiff sued alleging
fraud under the securities laws in connection with the administration and
maintenance of the pension fund." The Daniel court held that not only are
pension plans the sort of investment Congress intended to regulate under
See The Pendulum Swings, supra note 1, at 906-11.
'o See 421 U.S. at 848,852; Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae at 21, Daniel v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The Forman decision is in no way incon-
sistent with the principles enunciated in the previous [Supreme Court] decisions").
42 Compare Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977) (technical
compliance with Howey required even where disclosure beneficial) with Daniel v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1977), (Howey read broadly to cover pension
plan primarily because the plans constituted the major form of investment for workers).
42 561 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1232 (1978).
a 435 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977).
"In a "noncontributory" pension plan, the total financial burden of the plan is borne
by the employer. Note, Interest in a Noncontributory, Compulsory Employee Pension Plan
Deemed Subject to the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, Daniel v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 VmL. L. Rav. 195, 196 n.14 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Interest in Pension Plan].
'3 In a "compulsory" plan, the employee cannot choose to receive the contribution per-
sonally in lieu of future payments from the fund. Id. at 196 n.14.
11 561 F.2d at 1256.
41 Id. at 1229-30. The plaintiffs first count alleged a breach of § 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(b) (1977). 561 F.2d at 1229-
30. Count IT alleged a violation of § 17(a) of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1976). The
plaintiff claimed that the union materially misrepresented the plan to its member. Of partic-
ular importance was the failure of the union to inform the plaintiff that the actuarial proba-
bility of an employee receiving pension benefits was as low as eight percent. 561 F.2d at 1229.
19781
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the securities laws48 but also that the alleged fraud was the type that the
securities laws were passed to prevent and remedy. 9
The Daniel court found the pension plan to be substantially similar to
561 F.2d at 1241; accord, Schlansky v. United Merchants & Mfg., Inc., [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) '196,353 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1977). The Daniel court
reasoned that since the securities laws were aimed at protecting the average investor, the most
common forms of investment should be subject to the disclosure provisions of those laws. 561
F.2d at 1257; see Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 617 n.4 (7th Cir.), (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), quoting SEC Amicus Curiae brief, rev'd 419 U.S. 506 (1973). For a discussion of
the importance of pension plans to the average worker, see Comment, Securities Regulation
of Employee Pension Plans In the Wake of the Daniel Decision, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 697 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Wake of Daniel].
The Daniel court maintained that although the legislative history of the '33 and '34 Acts
are silent on whether pension plans are covered, subsequent legislative action supported their
coverage in two ways. 561 F.2d at 1237-38. The court first noted that Congress in 1934 rejected
an amendment to the '33 Act which would have exempted employment plans for extra
compensation or stock investment from registration requirements. Id.; see H.R. REP. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934). The failure to adopt this amendment arguably demon-
strates that Congress had some form of employee security in mind when it enacted the '34
Act and that the broad definition given in the Acts reveals an intent to cover pension plans.
561 F.2d at 1238 n.32.
Secondly, the court noted that a 1970 amendment exempting certain pension plans from
the registration requirements of the '33 Act indicated a congressional determination that such
plans are "securities." Id. at 1239; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(11) (1976). A similar amendment
was added to the '34 Act. 561 F.2d at 1238; see 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1976). Although the
court's interpretation is reasonable, there is no basis for the court to defer to a congressional
interpretation of a prior Congress' intent. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 381
U.S. 252, 269 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346-49 (1963);
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).
11 561 F.2d at 1242. If the union members had realized the minimal likelihood of receiving
benefits, they could have attempted to alter the scheme. Cognizant of this fact, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that since full disclosure would have achieved this protection, the rationale
underlying the full disclosure provisions of the Acts dictated the extended coverage. See Wake
of Daniel, supra note 48, at 699. See also Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: H,
FORTUNE, August 1933, at 55.
In 1975, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). ERISA requires that a "summary plan description" be provided
to all employee pension plan participants and beneficiaries. Id. at § 1021(a). This summary
plan must disclose such information as eligibility requirements and circumstances which may
result in disqualification or denial of benefits. Id. at § 1022(b). Since this was the type of
information involved in Daniel, the defendant argued that the antifraud provisions of the '33
and '34 Acts were impliedly repealed as applied to pension plans even if the sections were
originally applicable. 561 F.2d at 1246.
Provisions in ERISA indicate that such an implied repeal was not intended. Section
514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144d (1976), provides that ERISA shall not be construed to supersede
any federal law or rule promulgated as part of its implementation. Furthermore, §
514(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1976), explicitly preserved each state's securities
laws which generally do not exclude pensions from their antifraud provisions. See Daniel v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d at 1246. When these two provisions are read in light
of the fact that disclosure under the securities laws is to take place prior to the investment,
as opposed to ERISA's providing for disclosure only to "participants and beneficiaries," the




traditional securities." The court maintained that such a finding was re-
quired by language introducing the definitional sections of the Acts.5' The
plan was held to resemble a mutual fund since in both devices a pool of
money is invested for the benefit of the fund by the fund manager.52
Whereas the mutual fund shareholder provides money when purchasing
shares in the fund, the employee invests money through his employer's
contributions to the plan's trust on his behalf. 3 The Seventh Circuit rea-
soned that since an interest in a mutual fund is a security,54 the interest
in a pension plan, which involves risk" and has features similar to a mutual
fund, should also be considered a security."1
In contrast, the district court in Robinson refused to extend coverage
of the Acts to retirement trust funds finding such schemes too far removed
from traditional securities to warrant inclusion within the definition given
in the Acts.'7 Robinson involved a union retirement fund out of which
death benefits and health care coverage were to be extended to the spouse
and dependents of members." A beneficiary brought suit alleging that the
deceased employee had been told that the plan entailed lifetime health
coverage instead of the five year coverage actually offered the beneficiary."
Alluding to the Supreme Court's recent reluctance to extend the scope of
the securities laws,"° the Robinson court noted that, until Daniel," no court
1 561 F.2d at 1235-36.
51 Id. The court felt compelled to compare the pension plan to traditional securities
because of the words "unless the context otherwise requires" which introduces the defini-
tional section of both the '33 and '34 Act. Id. at 1236, quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976).
Although similarities with traditional securities help in determining coverage, this factor is
not determinative. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). Thus the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning that the Acts require such a comparison is questionable.
52 561 F.2d at 1236. For a discussion of mutual funds, see generally The Mutual Fund
Industry, A Symposium, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rlv. 955 (1972).
561 F.2d at 1231-32.
"Id. at 1236. See Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor-
wath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
"See note 36 supra.
" 561 F.2d at 1236; accord, Schlansky v. United Merchants, & Mfg., Inc. [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,353 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1977). The Seventh
Circuit also found the plaintiff's interest in the pension plan to be like an interest in a variable
annuity contract. These contracts are forms of insurance in which premiums collected are
invested primarily in common stock and other equities with benefit payments varying with
the success of the investment policy. Such contracts have been held to be securities within
the meaning of the security laws. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69
(1959); see SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1966). For a discussion of such
contracts, see generally Proceedings of Conference on Variable Annuities and Variable Life
Insurance, 32 Bus. LAw. 675 (1977).
" See 435 F. Supp. 245, 246 (D.C.C. 1977).
435 F. Supp. at 245.
' Id.
0Id., citing, United Hous. Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
"1 The Robinson decision was subsequent to the district court ruling in Daniel, 410 F.
Supp. 541 (N.D. Ill. 1976), but prior to the Seventh Circuit's opinion. The circuit court
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had held an involuntary, noncontributory pension or health benefit plan
to be a security." Contrary to Daniel, the Robinson court maintained that
such plans do not involve investment decisions similar to those the securi-
ties laws were enacted to protect."s
The Robinson court failed to address the fact that the disclosure provi-
sions of the '33 Act might have prevented the alleged fraud in both
Robinson and Daniel. The investment decision involved in Robinson and
Daniel was whether to exchange one's labor for an interest in a scheme
promising specific benefits at a later date." Had the employees in
Robinson known that the benefits were to last only five years or had the
plaintiff in Daniel known that an involuntary lay-off could eliminate cover-
age, the employees might not have accepted the plan as part of their
collective bargaining agreement."5 This result is substantially similar to an
investor refusing to invest capital in a mutual fund due to the disclosure
of material facts by the promoter." Thus the Robinson court's distinction
based on the character of the investment appears questionable.
The Robinson court also maintained that such retirement plans could
opinion, however, reflects the reasoning of the district court decision and therefore the
Robinson court's criticism is applicable. See Definition of a "Security", supra note 13, at 869
n.43.
62 435 F. Supp. at 246; accord, Weins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters [1977-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,005 (C.D. Cal. March 28, 1977). Daniel and
Robinson are distinguishable on their facts but the distinctions are inconsequential. In stress-
ing the distinctions, the Daniel court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
beneficiary-plaintiff's in Robinson were spouses and dependents of the deceased employee.
The Seventh Circuit maintained that such a plaintiff could not be considered an investor as
was the employee-plaintiff in Daniel because they could not be said to have contributed to
the fund. 561 F.2d at 1233. Although this criticism is justifiable as to the "actual purchaser"
standing requirements enunciated in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975), the factor is irrelevant in determining whether a "security" exists in light of the
disclosure purposes of the Acts. The employee in Robinson would have been as equally
concerned as the employee in Daniel had he been informed that expected benefits were
unlikely to be received. To attempt to discern whether a scheme was a security on the basis
of the plaintiff's standing would be contrary to the Supreme Court's focus on the character
of the scheme. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1948).
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished Robinson because in Robinson benefits had tradi-
tionally been paid out of current contributions from the employer. Thus the Daniel court
reasoned that Robinson lacked the expectation of profit existing in Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1733.
There is no indication, however, that the scheme in Robinson was dependent on current
contributions being used as benefits. In fact, an investment trust was central to scheme. 435
F. Supp. at 246. Thus in terms of the scheme as presented to the employee evaluating the
employment contract, there was an expectation of profit from investment of trust funds in
both Daniel and Robinson.
11 435 F. Supp. at 246.
" See Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977); cf. Inland
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied in part, 336 U.S. 960 (1949),
aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 381 (1950) (employer's contribution to the plan is in exchange
for employee's labor).
" See Wake of Daniel, supra note 48, at 699.
" See Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Kerkstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d
811 (2nd Cir. 1975).
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not satisfy the Howey criteria for an investment contract. The court
stressed that all contributions were to be made by the employer on a fixed
formula. 7 From this fact, the court reasoned that the employees had not
"invested money" within the meaning of Howey because they lacked con-
trol over the amount of investment." The court further asserted that the
plan generated no "profits" for the employees because the interests in the
funds were inalienable and because excess funds would not be reinvested
for the individual employee's profit. 9 The employee, therefore, could re-
ceive only the amount established by the collective bargaining agreement.
Because this resulted in the employee exchanging a fixed amount of labor
for a specified return of benefit, the court held that the Howey profit
criterion was not met.
70
In contrast, the Daniel court stated that the plan satisfied all the
Howey criteria for an investment contract. 7' This reasoning is logically
more sound than the Robinson decision. The threshold issue under the
Howey criteria is whether there is an "investment of money." If the
employer-paid contributions to the pension fund can be considered eco-
nomic compensation to the employee, this criterion is met. 72 In Daniel, the
contributions were equivalent to compensation since the money the em-
ployer was contributing into the fund otherwise might have been paid as
wages. In addition, the pension plan, like wages, may have induced em-
ployees to keep their present employment rather than obtaining higher
wages from employers not offering such a plan. Accordingly, the employee
had made an "investment of money. ' 73 Furthermore, the plan undoubtedly
satisfied the "common enterprise" requirement as the fund managers
pooled the employer's contribution made on behalf of each employee. 74
Despite the reasoning of the Robinson court, the employees in both Daniel
and Robinson, also had an "expectation of profits"'" because they realized
67 Id. Contributions by the operators were on a per tonnage basis and the employees could
neither convert the payments to personal use nor change the amount of the payments. 435
F. Supp. at 247.
" Id.
" Id. The inability to transfer interest in the plans and the fixed rate of return makes
the scheme comparable to that involved in Forman. See United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. at 838-39.
0 435 F. Supp. at 247.
" 561 F.2d at 1231-35.
12 Id. at 1233. The Seventh Circuit listed substantial authority for the proposition that
employer contributions to a pension fund are in fact compensation to the employee. See Lewis
v. Benedict Coal Coop., 361 U.S. 459,469 (1960); Employing Plasterers' Assoc. v. Journeyman
Plasterer's Protective & Benevolent Soc'y, 279 F.2d 92, 99 (7th Cir. 1960); P. DRUCKER, THE
UNSEEN REVOLUTON 8, 34 (1976); Note, Legal Problems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARv.
L. REV. 490, 494 (1957). But see United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 854-
58 (non-cash benefits such as lower rent found not to be profit).
13 See 561 F.2d at 1231-35; 5 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 591, 600 (1977).
" See 561 F.2d at 1233; notes 89-106 infra. For a discussion of the pooling requirement
within the Howey "common enterprise" context, see generally Bennett, How Common Is A
Common Enterprise?, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 339, 346-62 (1974).
11 561 F.2d at 1233-35.
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that the fund managers would invest the contributions in profit making
schemes7" and because the viability of the fund depended on such profits
being realized.77 Finally, since the fund managers invested the funds on
behalf of the employees, the profits came solely from efforts of noninves-
tors.8 Thus the Seventh Circuit correctly found that the pension plan
encompassed all of the elements required under Howey for an investment
contract.
Despite being contrary to the recent Supreme Court policy of limiting
the scope of the securities laws, the Daniel decision should be followed. By
1980, forty-two million American workers are expected to belong to pension
plans.79 As emphasized by the Daniel court, not only are such plans the
sole form of retirement investment for a majority of the industrial work
force, but the plans also control over a quarter of the entire capital mar-
ket.8" The need for maximum protection in this area is illustrated by the
fact that in 1972, 1,227 pension plans were terminated, resulting in a loss
of $49,000,000 in pension benefits for 19,400 participating workers.'
Although recent federal regulation should help eliminate many pension
fund problems,82 application of the securities laws in this area would fur-
nish the extra precaution of providing the employee-investors with a right
to information on the character of the scheme prior to the actual contribu-
tion of any money.83 Anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws would
require plan managers to disclose all material facts prior to the employee's
investment decision.84 Thus by providing "a self-executing compulsion ''M
to disclose adequate information, fund managers, like those involved in
Daniel and Robinson, would be required to disclose such information as
the statistical probability of benefits being paid and the length of time
benefits will continue.8 Providing this information to the union member-
ship prior to voting on a collective bargaining agreement, containing a
plan, and to the individual deciding to accept employment, would allow
employees to understand fully what benefits would be received in exchange
7' See Wake of Daniels, supra note 48, at 704.
See 561 F.2d at 1233-35; Wake of Daniels, supra note 48, at 704.
7' 561 F.2d at 1233-35.
S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973). Reprinted in [1973] 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4838; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER
PRIVATE RETIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBUC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS vi (1965).
561 F.2d at 1235.
" DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & DEPT. OF LABOR, STUDY OF PENSION PLAN TERMINATION 18
(1973); see Note, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and
Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 539, 542-45 (1975).
11 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976); Comment, Application of Federal Securities Laws
to Noncontributory, Defined Benefit Plans, 45 CH. L. REv. 124, 145-49 (1977).
See Wake of Daniels, supra note 48, at 717.
" 561 F.2d at 1249. The Daniels court stated that a pension fund would not be required
to comply with registration requirements due to an 1970 amendment of § 5 of the '33 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77e (1976), exempting certain funds from registration. 561 F.2d at 1239-1243.
" 561 F.2d at 1249.
" See Wake of Daniels, supra note 48, at 722.
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for their labor. Since the securities laws were designed to achieve equality
of information between those promoting a scheme and those seeking in-
vestment," and since the plans arguably can satisfy the Howey definition
of investment contracts, application of the Acts is appropriate."
Other recent lower court decisions focusing on the elements of an
"investment contract" illustrate the conflict between the remedial focus
of Howey and Tcherepnin and the restrictive policy underlying Forman.
One area especially illuminating is the reading given the "common enter-
prise" element of Howey. Recent decisions indicate two entirely different
interpretations of this requirement." One interpretation establishes a vert-
ical *approach by requiring an interdependence between the "fortunes of
the investor" and the "efforts and success" of the promotors.1° Under this
analysis, a common enterprise exists when each investor's profit is a func-
tion of the same factors, primarily the investing expertise of the promot-
ers.9 The other interpretation is more restrictive and horizontal in nature
requiring that the fortunes of any one investors be directly related to the
success or failure of other investors."2 Thus this approach requires an actual
pooling of funds resulting in a "sharing in the earning and profits" of the
scheme."
Differing results reached in circuits deciding whether discretionary
trading accounts" are securities evidence the effect of these horizontal and
vertical approaches.'5 Discretionary trading accounts involve an investor
placing funds in an account and executing a power of attorney appointing
'3See note 23 supra.
'3The Seventh Circuit in Daniel succinctly stated the issue underlying the policy argu-
ment favoring application of the securities laws to pension plans:
Since the anti-fraud provisions do not impose an undue burden on anyone, [why]
should [they not] be available to employees to remedy fraud... . The proper
inquiry then is not whether interests in employee pension plans are securities but
rather why such a vital investment vehicle should be nevertheless excluded from
the protection of the securities law.
561 F.2d at 1242.
'3 See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977); Curran
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SE. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,862 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 1976); Newton, supra note 14, at 176-81.
" See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); '74 "Security", supra note 17, at 724.
,1 See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 473-79 (5th Cir. 1974).
'2 See, e.g., Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
13 See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977), quoting, SEC
v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
", For a discussion of different types of trading accounts, see E.F. Hutton v. Burkholder,
413 F. Supp. 852, 860 (D.D.C. 1976).
,- Compare Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977) (a
discretionary trading account is a security only if there is a sharing of profits) with Marshall
v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486,489 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (sharing of profits not determinative
because unlikely that protection of securities laws are "available only to those hapless capital-
ists who are not alone in their misfortune").
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an account manager as his agent and attorney in fact to invest the funds."
The key factor in terms of Howey is that each investor's account is kept
separate from the accounts of other investors.97 The courts adopting the
horizontal approach maintain that there is no "common enterprise." The
success of the account of the individual investor is not related to the suc-
cess of other investors98 because there is not a pooling of the funds and
sharing of profits." The courts adopting the vertical approach, however,
have found the requisite commonality to exist because the success of the
segregated accounts is tied inextricably to the efficacy of a single pro-
moter.' ® Therefore, courts following the vertical approach do not require
a pooling of funds.'9 '
The Supreme Court's treatment of the facts in Howey favors the use of
the horizontal approach. The Howey Court emphasized that, in reality, the
investor did not purchase a unit of land, but rather the right to an interest
in the profits of the orange grove as a whole.12 He provided capital by
which the promoter developed the grove. The investor had no rights in any
particular fruit, but rather the total produce was pooled for sale.'1 In
return for his capital, the investor received a percentage of the profits on
the total sale of produce based on the percentage of capital contributed.",
Since Forman requires a narrow reading of Howey to effectuate the Su-
preme Court's policy of limiting the scope of the Acts,'05 the pooling aspect
" See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1977); Bartley v. P.G.
Commodities Assoc., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fzi. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,365
(S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1978); Note, Discretionary Commodities Trading Account as a Security:
Is There a Common Enterprise?, 28 S.W.L.J. 602 (1974).
'" See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977).
" Id. In Hirk, the plaintiff had established a discretionary trading account with the
defendant upon the defendant's representation that he could not possibly lose more than
$7,500. Id. at 98. In fact, the plaintiff lost $17,880. The Seventh Circuit denied plaintiff's
claim under the securities laws, reaffirming its opinion by present Justice Stevens in Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit relied on the
language in Howey which focused on the "sharing in the earnings and profits." 561 F.2d at
101, quoting, SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300. Under Milnarik and Hirk, a discretionary
trading account can never be a security because each individual invests in different areas and
there is no understanding or expectation that the investors will share in a common fund
comprised of returns on their investments. See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d
at 101-02.
" 561 F.2d at 100.
1' See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516-22 (5th Cir. 1974).
10, See id.; Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D. Iowa 1974). Under the
vertical approach, the fact that the common investors defer to the expertise of the common
agent suffices for demonstrating Howey's "common enterprise." Cf. SEC v. Koscot Interpla-
netary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974) (pyramiding scheme satisfies "common enter-
prise" requirement due to the uniformity of impact of the promoter's effort). For a discussion
in support of this approach, see Long, Introduction Student Symposium: Interpreting the
Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic Considerations, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 96,
123-26 (1974).
'1 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 300.
'° Id. at 296.
I Id.
"o See cases cited at note 30 supra.
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of the investment contract in Howey cannot be disregarded. Thus those
schemes, including discretionary trading accounts, in which there is no
pooling of funds should not be considered investment contracts for pur-
poses of the securities laws.' Consequently, the vertical approach to the
common enterprise element of Howey should be abandoned in favor of the
horizontal approach requiring an actual pooling of funds and a percentage
distribution of profits.
A second area of Howey which has become increasingly controversial
is the "solely from the efforts of others" criterion."7 Primary focus has been
placed on the word "solely."'' 8 Recent decisions modify the "solely" re-
quirement, applying instead a test of whether the investor possesses a
significant managerial function which affects the success or the failure of
the enterprise."9 This adaptation of the "solely" criterion resulted from a
judicial desire to include inherently fraudulent pyramiding schemes,"'
within the provisions of the Acts."' Although such a modification avoids
'" See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1977); cf. Sullivan
v. Chase Investment Servs. Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,224 (N.D. Cal. March 25, 1977) (investor's use of common agent of investment advisory
service insufficient to satisfy Howey "common enterprise" element).
" See, e.g., Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,313 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 1978); Schultz v. Dain Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,303 (8th Cir. Jan. 27, 1978); Bell v. Health7Mor, Inc.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,007 (5th Cir. March 24, 1977).
in See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.
1973); Newton, supra note 14, at 185-92.
1 See, e.g., Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,313 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 1978); Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l Inc., 498 F.2d
183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 691-93 (3rd Cir. 1973).
110 See generally Note, Pyramid Scheme Regulation: The Evolution of Investment Con-
tracts As A Security Under The Federal Securities Law, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 690 (1974).
"Pyramid scheme" is a term denoting a particular use of middlemen by a promoter to help
distribute his products to ultimate consumers. Each salesperson, or middleman, recruits new
members into the scheme. Although the middleman often must purchase this recruitment
right, he obtains commissions both on the salespersons brought in and on the products they
sell. Id. at 693. In this manner, the salesman builds his own distribution pyramid by searching
out new recruits. For example, a salesperson who recruits five distributors who in turn recruit
five more will earn the commission of thirty salesmen in his chain. Note, Multi-level or
Pyramid Sales Systems: Fraud or Free Enterprise, 18 S.D.L. REv. 358, 359-61 (1973). The
basic problem with the scheme is that eventually there will be no one left to buy a distributor-
ship and thus the later buyers are left "holding the bag." 6 CREIGHTON L. Rov. 450, 457 (1973).
" The cases encouraging the abandonment of the "solely" requirement are SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), and SEC v. Koscot Interpla-
netary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). Koscot was a subsidiary of Glenn Turner Enter-
prises and the pyramiding schemes in both cases were substantially the same. Both schemes
included fraudulent, high pressure sales tactics for obtaining new members. Prior investors
portrayed to prospective investors that great profits had been made even though in reality
few members of the plan obtained any monetary gain. There was little question that the
schemes satisfied the Howey requirement of "investment of money" and "common enter-
prise." SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d at 478-79; SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprise, 474 F.2d at 480-83. The investor, however, clearly did not contemplate that his
profits were to be made "solely from the efforts of others" since the investor's ability to attract
others to the plan was critical to the success of both schemes. Both the Turner and Koscot
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the constraints of the "solely" standard in those cases where state remedies
are unavailable,1 2 the "efforts of others" criterion should not be read so
broadly as to encourage expansion of the Acts.
Recent decisions indicating an adoption of the "no managerial efforts"
test,"3 have tended to find that a security did not exist because of the
presence of managerial powers on the part of the investors. Thus, in
Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ' 4 a case involving a franchise ar-
rangement,"I the Tenth Circuit found that the "no managerial efforts" test
was not met when a franchisee-investor had the power to hire and fire
employees, set prices below the franchisor's suggested price and extend
credit apart from the franchisor's credit plan."' Likewise, in Schultz v.
Dain Corp., "7 the Eighth Circuit found that the sale of an apartment
complex coupled with management services failed to satisfy the "no mana-
gerial efforts test" because the investor retained the right to obtain new
management even though all the managerial powers were vested in the
courts held, however, that the remedial purposes of the Act required an abandonment of the
"solely" requirement. Thus the courts replaced the requirement with a determination of
whether the efforts of the investors are the essential managerial efforts which affect the
success or failure of the enterprise. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d at 483; SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d at 482.
, Recent Supreme Court securities cases illustrate a policy of fostering the use of state
remedies. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
By the time of the pre-trial hearings in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir. 1973), however, forty-one states had brought actions against the varied plans of
Glenn Turner. See In re Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Litigation, 521 F.2d 775, 777 (3rd Cir.
1975). Most of these actions were brought under state deceptive practices statutes, see, e.g.,
Dare To Be Great, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1974), or related provisions
aimed at pyramiding schemes. See, e.g., State v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668,
512 P.2d 416 (1973). Besides injunctions, state laws often allowed either the private party,
see e.g., KAN. STAT. § 50.636 (1976); Ky. Rv. STAT. § 367.220 (Cumin. Supp. 1976) (actual
damages or statutory penalty), or the attorney general of the state on behalf of such party,
see, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 50.632 (1976) (actual damages), to recover actual and punitive damages
for violation of the statutes. Since the states adequately regulate pyramiding schemes, those
decisions expanding the securities laws to cover such schemes seem questionable in light of
the Supreme Court's policy towards fostering the use of state remedies when adequate.
"' See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976); McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d
204, 211 (10th Cir. 1975); Jones v: International Inventors, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 119, 124-25
(N.D. Ga. 1976); SEC v. Norton, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
95,709 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 1976).
"1 570 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1978).
"' A franchise arrangement typically involves the franchisor offering to establish a fran-
chisee in a business under the franchisor's recognized name. The franchisee pays for the right
to establish the business and must operate the enterprise within broad guidelines established
by the franchisor. See, e.g., Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974). Fran-
chises generally fail to meet the "efforts of others" test of Howey. See Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River
City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (10th Cir. 1972), aff'g, 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970);
Franchise Agreements, supra note 18 at 65-67.
"1 570 F.2d at 877; accord, Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir.
1974).
17 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. XXXV
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
promoter."' The results in Crowley and Schultz accord with outcomes
obtainable by use of the "solely" standard because under that standard the
investors' activity beyond capital contribution would have precluded de-
noting the schemes securities. Accordingly, a restrictive application of the
"no managerial efforts" test, as illustrated by Crowley and Schultz, is no
more than the "solely" standard under another name. Nevertheless, the
modification appropriately allows flexibility in those circumstances war-
ranting extended protection because it provides potential coverage to those
investors who do more than just furnish capital. Thus the "no managerial
efforts" test properly provides courts with the means to balance the judi-
cial policy of restricting the scope of the Acts with the remedial purposes
underlying the legislation.
Besides limiting the trend of expanding the coverage of the securities
laws, the Forman Court's reaffirmance of Howey makes questionable the
"risk capital" approach which some courts had substituted for the forty-
two year old Howey test."' Under this approach, the courts analyze the
nature2 ' and the degree of investor risk which accompanies a transac-
tion." The theory underlying this approach is that as the risk of non-
payment increases, dependence on the efforts of others for repayment or
profit increases proportionally indicating a scheme paralleling traditional
securities.'2 In Forman, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to apply the
"risk capital" approach.'2
In focusing on the nature of the risk involved under the "riskcapital"
approach, the issue is whether the impetus for the investor is primarily of
a commercial or of an investment nature. 24 The distinction has been char-
"' Id. at 93,021; accord, Fargo Partners v. Dain, 405 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd,
540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976).
"' See Comment, Securities Regulations-Securities Covered-Shares in Cooperative
Housing Corporation As Securities Under The Federal Securities Acts, 26 CASE W." Rs. L.
REv. 735, 753-56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Co-op Shares]; 1 J. CoRP. L. 639, 649-50 (1976).
I2" The focus on the "nature" of the risk parallels the "economic reality" analysis often
used in conjunction with the Howey test. See note 36 supra.
"2 See, e.g., El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228-30 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
" See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1976);
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P. 2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961)
(membership in a country club found to be a security under state securities laws because"
success of club depended on promoter attracting sufficient investors); Definition of a
"Security," supra note 13, at 877.
' United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. at 857 n.24. The Court did not
say it would never use the "risk capital" approach. Had the test been used, however, the court
likely would have reached a different result as the holders of the Forman shares faced a
significant risk of loss on the resale of their shares if the housing project proved unsuccessful.
See Co-op Shares, supra note 119, at 756-57; 1 J. CoRP. L. 639, 649-50 (1976). Since the
Supreme Court refused to use the "risk capital" approach to classify the shares in Forman
as securities, the use of the approach is questionable in circumstances where use of the Howey
test is reasonable.
III See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1976);
Motel Ca. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir. 1965) (distinction is between "risk
loan" and "risk capital").
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acterized as the "commercial-investment" dichotomy.'1 This dichotomy is
illustrated by the recent case of McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of
Denver Mortgage Investors.' In McGovern, the Tenth Circuit adopted an
analysis utilizing both the Howey test and the nature of the risk aspect of
the risk capital approach.1 2' The question raised in this case was whether
the term "security" as used in the Acts encompassed construction loan or
permanent loan commitments, a category of documents not listed in the
definition of "security" in either act.' In focusing on the nature of the risk,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff was seeking financing to build a hotel
and that any profits which the plaintiff expected resulted from the opera-
tion of that enterprise rather than from obtaining the commitments.1 2 The
court concluded that the plaintiff's efforts in obtaining the commitments
were purely commercial in nature and therefore the commitments were not
investment securities under the "risk capital" approach.'0 Accordingly,
the court found that, in terms of the Howey test, the commitments failed
to satisfy the "efforts of others" criterion. 3 '
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United California Bank v. THC
Financial Corp. 132 illustrates the degree of risk aspect of the "risk capital"
approach. At issue in THC Financial was whether a finance company's
agreement to purchase on demand all notes taken by a bank to secure
advances under a line of credit to a third business constituted a security. 13
In measuring the risk involved, the court listed a number of considerations
'2 See also Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3rd Cir. 1973).
'- 562 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1977). Although the Tenth Circuit did not explicitly state that
it was using the "risk capital" approach, the court's use of the "commercial-investment
dichotomy" indicates an acceptance of such an analysis. The court phrased this issue in terms
of whether the transaction was of a kind in which stock is often given. Id. at 647; see Zabriskie
v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974). Rather than abandoning the Howey test, however,
the Tenth Circuit incorporated the "risk capital" approach into the "efforts of others" cri-
teria. 562 F.2d at 647. More appropriately, however, the court could have used the commercial
nature of the transaction to find that there had been no "investment" of money as required
by Howey.
171 Id. at 647-48.
'' Id. at 646. The loan commitment was an agreement by First of Denver representing
that it was "ready, willing, and able" to provide construction financing to the plaintiff upon
certain conditions. Id. One such condition was that a permanent loan commitment be ob-
tained from defendant, B.F. Saul Advisory Co. This commitment was an irrevocable promise
to loan a specific amount to the plaintiff. Id.
'12 562 F.2d at 647.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
'3 Id. at 92,057. The notes issued by the borrowing business as part of the agreement
matured in one month. Id. at 92,061. These notes would fall under exceptions in the Acts
which exclude short-term commercial paper from coverage since this type of paper is gener-
ally not of an investment nature. See note 10 supra; Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d
1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a), 78c(10)




including time, collateralization, form of obligation, circumstances of issu-
ance, the relationship between the amount borrowed and the size of the
borrower's business and the contemplated use of funds. 3' Applying these
criteria to THC Financial, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the finance
company had extensive knowledge of the third party's fiscal makeup, that
the agreement was to last only six months, and that the finance company
felt little risk was involved." 5 Therefore, the court held that this situation
was similar to a "risky loan" associated with commercial transactions, and
not "risk capital", funds risked to a degree greater than generally asso-
ciated with typical commercial investment situations. 3
Unlike the Tenth Circuit in McGovern Plaza, the Ninth Circuit did not
apply the Howey test, even though the result in THC Financial could have
been reached by use of the older standard. Central to the "risk capital"
approach is the theory that as the risk increases so does the investors
dependence on the "efforts of others."'37 When the Howey "efforts of oth-
ers" criteria is applied to the facts of THC Financial, the agreement cannot
be considered a security. The success of the third business did not affect
the finance company's profit. As long as the business remained solvent, the
finance company was assured it would not lose its gain acquired from the
cost of the agreement to the business. The only profit making activity from
the finance company's point of view was its own ability to secure a good
credit risk. Since the person claiming the protection of the Acts was also
the person controlling the profit making activity, the Howey "efforts of
others" test was not met.
Since the Forman opinion indicates the Supreme Court's preference for
the Howey test, the "risk capital" approach should be used only to supple-
ment this standard. Inasmuch as the Howey test as written requires an
"investment of money," the nature of the risk analysis illustrated by
McGovern Plaza can be used to determine if an "investment" has oc-
curred. The "degree of risk" aspect can be used as part of the "profit from
efforts of others" analysis. Such an intertwining of the two approaches
helps refine the Howey standard by utilizing the "risk capital" analysis.
The Forman opinion indicates both a reaffirmation of the Howey test
and a policy of tempering the expansion of the scope of securities law. Only
in compelling circumstances should the coverage of the Acts be extended.
Such circumstances are illustrated by the Daniel opinion extending the
Acts to pension funds, an area pervaded by fraud and of utmost import-
ance to American labor.' Typically, the Howey criteria should be read
strictly to avoid expansion of the Act. Thus in discerning what is a
"1 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,125, at 92,061; see Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FEu. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,125, at 92,061.
l" Id.
In See Pollock, Notes Issued in Syndicated Loans-A New Test to Define Securities, 32
Bus. LAW. 537, 544 (1977); Definition of a "Security," supra note 13, at 877.
"4 See text accompanying notes 76-79.
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